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This essay examines credibility in monetary policy.  In 
particular it follows Blinder’s (2000) survey in focusing on why 
such credibility is important and the role that central bank 
transparency plays in determining it.  It also considers what 
happens when credibility changes. It finds that credibility is 
particularly important for maintaining low and stable inflation 
through its effect on inflation expectations and that 
transparency’s role involves influencing those expectations.  
Improving credibility may actually increase volatility unless 
central banks take the change into account and adjust their 
reaction functions accordingly. 
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1 Introduction 
It has often been observed that central bankers are 
obsessed with their credibility (Shaumburg and Tambalotti, 
2007).  Why is that?  What is credibility?  How do you get it?  
As with any abstract concept, credibility is difficult to 
pin down and even more difficult to measure.  In a general sense, 
credibility means that “a central bank is credible if people 
believe it will do what it says” (Blinder, 2000).  To be more 
specific, credibility can be defined by and measured as the 
extent to which inflation expectations are anchored on a 
specified target.1  
This essay examines central bank credibility in 
monetary policy, focusing on why such credibility is important 
and the role that transparency plays in determining it.  The 
structure of the paper is as follows.  Section two sets out a brief 
background to credibility in monetary policy by considering a 
survey of central bankers and economists on the topic.  Section 
three notes why credibility is important, section four looks at its 
role and section five discusses what happens when credibility 
changes.  This is followed by a brief consideration of the 
possibilities for further work in this area (section 6) and some 
brief concluding remarks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  For example: monetary policy credibility can be “measured by the 
proximity of private-sector inflation expectations for different time 
horizons to the inflation target. The closer the expectations are to the 
target, the higher the degree of credibility” (Svensson,2009) and 
“…the credibility of the inflation target – by which we mean the 
degree to which expectations of inflation are anchored on the target.” 
(Amano et al, 1998). 	  




Blinder (2000) conducted a survey of central bankers and 
macro and monetary economists in a bid to answer two 
questions:  
(1) “Why is credibility so important to central bankers?”  
(2) “How can a central bank create or enhance 
credibility?”  
In brief, the responses to his survey highlighted the fact that 
central bankers and economists believe that credibility is 
important for a number of reasons, primarily to help keep 
inflation low and to enable less costly disinflation.  The general 
consensus of the survey was that the best ways to establish or 
maintain credibility is through central bank independence, 
historical performance and transparency; not through 
commitment to a rule or personal incentives. 
This essay aims to assess the opinions expressed in 
Blinder’s survey, that (1) credibility is important because it 
helps to keep inflation low; and that (2) an important way to 
gain credibility is through transparency.  It focuses on the role of 
credibility in maintaining low and stable inflation because, 
arguably, many inflation-targeting banks have already achieved 
this, and so the primary importance of credibility for them is the 
way in which it helps (or hinders) the maintenance of that level.  
Transparency is considered because I take it as given that 
historical performance is an effective way to gain credibility – 
after all, this is fairly intuitive.  A discussion of some of the 
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implications of changing credibility and a suggestion for further 
empirical work follows.  
3 The importance of credibility 
Credibility is often defined by the degree to which inflation 
expectations are anchored on the inflation target.  Blinder 
illustrates why this is important with a simple model of the 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve.  Using his example:  
πt = πet – β(ut – u*t) + γzt + εt 
where πt is actual inflation at time t, πet is expected inflation, ut – 
u*t is the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate and zt 
is a vector of supply-side variables (eg. oil prices).  
As can be seen, expected inflation influences actual 
inflation.  This occurs through the impact of expected inflation 
on price and wage setting behaviour.  If expectations are 
anchored on the target then there is less inflationary pressure, 
thereby making it easier for the central bank to maintain low and 
stable inflation (Bean, 2005).  A high degree of credibility is 
desirable because it means expected inflation is close to the 
target and there is a shorter time lag between monetary policy 
and its effects (Amano et al, 1998; Dillén and Nilsson, 1998).  
This is generally a desirable state of affairs, although changing 
credibility can cause problems, upon which I will elucidate later.  
4 The role of transparency 
In this context, “transparency” means giving the public 
insights into the central bank’s decisions and decision making 
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process so that they are not ‘surprised’ by those decisions.  Why 
do central bankers and economists rank transparency as an 
important element in establishing or maintaining credibility?  
Establishing credibility through historical performance can 
be “time-consuming and costly” (Dillén and Nilsson, 1998) 
(henceforth D&N), whereas establishing credibility by 
increasing transparency can be relatively quick.  This may be 
one of the reasons why transparency was ranked reasonably 
highly in Blinder’s survey.  This then begs the question that 
D&N ask: “Is increased transparency invariably beneficial?”  
The short answer is “no”: there are potential short term costs, 
although the long run gains dominate these.  Transparency can 
be increased by, among other things: defining an inflation target, 
publishing prospects and forecasts, and stating how inflation 
will be brought back to target.  
D&N set out three key benefits arising from transparency, 
namely: credibility gains; a reduction in uncertainty; and 
positive incentives.  With regard to credibility: if a central bank 
is transparent and it does what it says, then credibility increases 
and the public is more likely to believe the bank’s actions and 
announcements, and base expectations around the target rate.  
The potential loss of credibility arising from the central bank 
reneging on its published statements gives it an incentive to 
ensure that its forecasting and analysis (upon which its 
published statements are presumably based) are as accurate as 
possible, and means that the bank will be less inclined to spring 
surprises on the public.  
However, it is conceptually possible for transparency to 
actually harm credibility.  This could happen, for example, if a 
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bank’s forecasts are inaccurate.  In such a case the public can 
see how poor the forecasts are and hence will place less reliance 
on the resulting policy statements; where this occurs, more 
transparency actually leads to lower credibility.  What’s more, if 
the bank wants to deviate from its announced intentions then it 
loses credibility.  This problem can be mitigated by the central 
bank publishing (as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, RBNZ, 
does) alternative scenarios based on what it sees as the “main 
risks and uncertainties around the central forecast” (Drew & 
Karagedikli, 2008). 
D&N model these costs through simulations in Rixmod: a 
general equilibrium model used by the Sveriges Riksbank that is 
similar to models used by the Bank of Canada (Quarterly 
Projection Model, QPM) and the RBNZ (Forecasting and Policy 
System, FPS).  This analysis highlights that: (1) transparency is 
beneficial but transparent announcements should not be rushed 
and (2) accurate forecasting is highly important so that central 
banks do not need to deviate from announced policies.  
In his comment on D&N’s paper, Fischer (1998) notes that 
transparency is not always needed for credibility: once a central 
bank establishes a good track record then transparency is no 
longer so important.  Blinder’s survey emphasised this: central 
bankers and economists ranked a history of honesty, central 
bank independence and a history of fighting inflation above 
transparency as the best ways to establish and maintain 
credibility.  
Drew and Karagedikli (2008) examine the consequences of 
transparency for credibility and monetary policy’s effectiveness 
via its impact on New Zealand’s yield curve.  In New Zealand, 
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movements in interest rates following monetary policy 
announcements indicate that both the announcements and 
inflation target are viewed as credible.  Drew and Karagedikli 
(2008) also refer to a number of empirical studies that claim that 
the RBNZ is one of the most transparent banks in the world, and 
that this transparency has resulted in “reduced output and 
inflation variability in New Zealand.”  This lends weight to the 
views expressed in Blinder’s survey, that transparency is 
important for credibility and that the most important role of 
credibility is to keep inflation low.  
Drew and Karagedikli (2008) note that in the past it has 
sometimes been argued that transparent communication creates 
a risk to central bank credibility.  This could eventuate if the 
bank was unable to keep a commitment that it had made.  Drew 
and Karagedikli (2008) conclude that their findings provide 
some evidence to contradict this view.  
5 Some implications of 
changing credibility  
It is worth restating the potential cost of changes in inflation 
expectations.  If a central bank increases transparency, agents 
will (hopefully) change their expectations to the extent that they 
see announcements as being credible.  
A central bank’s model contains a specification and 
estimate of these expectations.  These affect actual inflation, the 
time that it takes for monetary policy to take effect, and 
therefore the appropriate short-run interest rate in the model.  If 
expectations change then the accuracy of analyses (and 
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consequently their credibility) may be damaged.  It is difficult to 
forecast (or even measure) this change in expectations and 
consequently it is difficult to formally include it in a model.  
In their RIXMOD simulations, D&N also find that when 
transparency (and therefore credibility) increases, the central 
bank’s response function needs to be adjusted to take account of 
changing expectations and the fact that this may shorten the 
control lag between monetary policy actions and their effect on 
the inflation rate, thereby requiring shorter forecasting horizons.  
If adjustments to shorten the horizon are not made, volatility 
may actually increase.  The precise effects on expectations need 
to be carefully considered when an attempt is made to increase 
credibility via transparency.  
D&N do note however, that these effects only occur when 
the degree of transparency changes and therefore any costs 
arising from increased volatility are only short-run; in the long-
run, the benefits of increasing transparency outweighs its short-
run costs.  
Amano et al (1998) (henceforth AC&M) look at “monetary 
rules when economic behaviour changes” and obtain a similar 
result to that of D&N.  One of the key behavioural changes that 
they look at (and the one that we are interested in) is that caused 
by changing monetary policy credibility.  In order to do this they 
consider an inflation targeting regime with inflation-forecast-
based (IFB) rules, where monetary policy is determined by 
whether the “rule-consistent forecast of inflation... [differs from] 
the inflation target.”  These rules are chosen because they 
perform reasonably well over a range of models and shocks, and 
are generally accepted as preferable to using a model-specific 
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rule, which is likely to perform extremely well in one 
framework but poorly in others (Conway, 2000).  
The analysis is carried out using the Canadian Policy 
Analysis Model (CPAM), a stochastic model.  Like many other 
central banks, the Bank of Canada has made a push for 
increased credibility by introducing inflation targeting and by 
increasing “the transparency and accountability of monetary 
policy.”  The authors track through the evidence for increased 
credibility in Canada and then outline the model that they use 
for their results.  
Credibility affects the formation of inflation expectations. 
AC&M vary credibility in the model by varying the weight that 
agents place on the perceived inflation target when forming 
expectations.2   The simulations showed that an increase in 
credibility resulted in a decrease in inflation’s variability.  This 
is consistent with the idea that expected inflation influences 
actual inflation, and that if expectations are anchored firmly on 
the target, then inflation volatility would be expected to decrease.  
However, the variability of output was observed to increase.  
With higher credibility the central bank does not have to react as 
strongly to shocks; resulting in increased volatility of output.  
This suggests that if the central bank cares about output 
volatility, then it needs to adjust its reaction function as 
credibility changes.  This is because (as with D&N), as 
credibility increases, the lag between a change in monetary 
policy and its effect on inflation is reduced.  The reaction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See equations 3 and 4 in their paper.	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function needs to change to accommodate this.  Once this has 
been done, AC&M show a reduction in output volatility.  
AC&M also note that Taylor rules 3  appear to be less 
affected by changes in credibility than IFB rules.  Svensson 
(2009) also picks up on this concept, stating that “more stable 
inflation expectations… shift the forecast Taylor curve…closer 
to the origin and make the tradeoff between the stability of 
inflation and the stability of the real economy more favourable.”  
Thus, Taylor rules seem to be more robust in the face of 
changing levels of credibility.  The implication of this is that 
central banks that push for increased credibility may be wise to 
follow a Taylor-type rule.  
In his comment on AC&M’s paper, Hall (1998) cautions 
that we are still uncertain about some of the fundamentals of 
stochastic models; so we should view the insights from them as 
helping us to think about old problems in new ways, rather than 
allowing us to accept or reject specific policy rules or reaction 
functions.  He also suggests that adjusting the central bank’s 
reaction function “should mean putting even more onus on the 
importance of trying to gauge in a broad sense, the relative 
strengths of demand-side versus supply-side components of 
shocks.”  
As noted above, increased credibility means that the central 
bank does not need to react as heavily to shocks in order to 
target inflation.  This has the side effect of potentially increasing 
volatility.  The model that AC&M use has an endogenous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	   Monetary policy rules that indicate by how much nominal interest 
rates should be changed in response to differences between actual and 
targeted inflation and between actual and potential output.	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supply-side.  A step forward would be to explicitly model key 
features of the supply-side in order to enable central banks to 
take better account of key supply-side shocks, thereby more 
appropriately tailoring their responses to shocks.  
An example of a central bank that has done this is the 
RBNZ with its Kiwi Inflation Targeting Technology (KITT) 
model.  This explicitly models oil prices as directly affecting 
inflation, consumption, intermediate goods production and 
tradable goods production.4  Benĕs et al (2009) explain the 
model’s response to an oil price shock.  The conclusion reached 
from the model is that  
“although the shock has a large initial impact on 
headline inflation, the inflation profile across the 
medium-term horizon is relatively benign. This is a 
direct result of the supply and demand channels through 
which oil affects the economy offsetting each other at 
longer horizons. The policy response is very small and 
the confidence bands are wide.” 
Thus it appears that the RBNZ, for one, is putting more 
emphasis on the supply-side, allowing it to more accurately 
model and deal with supply-side shocks.  This would result in 
more appropriate actions in the face of changing credibility.  
Once inflation expectations are anchored on the target, then 
there will be less response to supply and demand shocks.  Bean 
(2005) gives an example where an increased level of credibility 
“enhances the effectiveness of policy through its impact on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  See for example Benĕs et al. (2009) Figure 2.1 on page 11 and Figure 
2.2 on page 15. 	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expectations.” He compares the impact of the oil price rises in 
2004 with the oil price rises in the 1970s.  Given what happened 
in the 1970s, it would be expected that inflation would rise and 
“market interest rates [would] move higher in the expectation of 
monetary tightening by central banks.”  This did not occur.  In 
fact, “inflation expectations…hardly moved.”  Bean gives higher 
credibility the credit for the small change in inflationary 
expectations.  
A final point about changing credibility comes from the 
results of Shaumburg and Tambalotti (2007).  They vary central 
bank credibility in a simple New Keynesian model showing that 
most of the gains from increasing credibility arise at relatively 
low levels of initial credibility and decline as credibility rises.  
Attention is also drawn to the non-linear relationship between 
credibility and welfare.  The implication of this is that even a 
small loss in credibility can have a significant welfare impact.  
This gives a possible explanation as to why central bankers are 
so ‘obsessed’ with credibility.5 
6 Where to from here? 
Individuals all behave differently and this makes it difficult 
to estimate, in terms of parameter values, how much changing 
transparency will affect credibility and therefore inflation 
expectations and inflation.  Future research could focus on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Note that Shaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) define credibility “in 
terms of the expected durability of policy commitments” rather than 
“the discrepancy between inflation expectations and the central 
bank’s inflation target.” 	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estimating these parameter changes by obtaining data for central 
banks (such as the RBNZ) for which there is evidence that 
increasing transparency has improved credibility and assisted in 
achieving and maintaining low and stable inflation.  A central 
bank pushing for higher credibility could then use these 
estimates to develop alternative scenarios which have the dual 
purpose of (a) aiding the bank in determining its monetary 
policy, and (b) informing agents of the uncertainty surrounding 
the forecast, thus alleviating the potential credibility loss that 
may occur from deviating from a particular scenario.  
Effort could also continue to be put into modelling supply-
side and demand-side shocks to allow central banks to more 
accurately predict the effects of, and the appropriate responses 
to, such shocks.  
7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, credibility is important because of its effect 
on the level and volatility of inflation.  Central bank 
transparency effectively builds and maintains credibility.  
Transparency can have some costs, but these costs shouldn’t be 
overemphasised, and they tend to be short-run.  As credibility 
changes, inflation expectations change; affecting the time lag 
between monetary policy actions and their effect.  This 
influences the appropriate monetary policy response, with 
respect to both how supply and demand shocks are handled, and 
the length of the forecast horizon.  This calls for a re-
optimisation of the central bank’s reaction function; if it isn’t, 
then volatility may actually increase.  
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